Indonesia's Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP): what is and who's involved?

This Explainer focuses on Indonesia's Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) - how it is structured, why human rights are particularly at stake in the Indonesian context, and what is needed to make the "just" components of transition operational, particularly when it comes to the role of business. For a general introduction to JETPs, see our Explainer What is a JETP? 

Indonesia's JETP at a glance

Indonesia is one of the world's largest coal economies, with coal powering over 60% of its electricity. In 2022, at the G20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia entered its Just Energy Transition Partnership (JEPT) with an International Partner Group of developed economies, securing in total $21 billion in financing and technical support. The partnership's headline targets are to increase the on-grid renewable energy share to 44% and reach peak power sector emissions by 2030.

The JETP is structured around six Investment Focus Areas (IFAs):

• IFA 1: Energy Efficiency and Electrification
• IFA 2: Transmission Lines and Grid Deployment
• IFA 3: Dispatchable Renewable Power Deployment Acceleration
• IFA 4: Variable Renewable Power Deployment Acceleration
• IFA 5:  Repurposing of Coal-Fired Power Plants
• IFA 6:  Renewable Energy Supply Chain Enhancement

2026 represents the third year of implementation, with the JETP Secretariat releasing a Progress Report for public consultation, alongside working group outputs on policy, financing, and just transition. The Indonesia JETP has already contributed to key regulatory progress, including a moratorium on new coal plants, a coal retirement framework, and improved conditions for renewable energy procurement. However, progress is slower than the stated ambitions, both in terms of emissions and in terms of justice.

Why human rights are particularly at stake in Indonesia

Indonesia's history of energy development gives direct cause for concern. Renewable energy projects have repeatedly led to conflict with local communities and loss of local livelihoods. The risks are not hypothetical - they are a documented pattern that a JETP-funded transition could either break or repeat.

What makes Indonesia's case distinctive is the central and growing role of private actors in driving the just energy transition. 

Who’s Involved in Indonesia’s Just Energy Transition?

Indonesia’s energy transition is one of the most complex and consequential underway in the developing world. The country is Southeast Asia’s largest economy and the world’s largest exporter of thermal coal, with coal-fired power plants supplying more than 60 per cent of its electricity. Moving away from this deep fossil fuel dependence toward a cleaner, more equitable energy system involves a vast constellation of actors, ranging from government ministries and state-owned enterprises to international financiers, organised labour, and grassroots advocacy networks.

Indonesia’s Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) - a climate finance platform launched in 2022 in partnership with a range of donor governments - has also evolved the stakeholders ecosystem engaged in Indonesia’s energy transition. Understanding who is involved -  and what role each actor plays - is helpful for anyone seeking to engage with or invest in  Indonesia’s energy transition - including understanding the country’s commitment to a just transition. 

This stakeholder map provides an initial overview of stakeholders currently involved in Indonesia’s just energy transition who are shaping the policies, financing mechanisms, providing technical assistance or advocacy, as well as their roles in the ecosystem.

As this non-exhaustive map illustrates, the ecosystem of actors involved in Indonesia's just energy transition is extensive and growing.

The JET ecosystem spans government ministries, state-owned enterprises, independent power producers, domestic and international financiers, civil society organisations, and multilateral bodies. Project developers, industrial energy users, and financial institutions sit at the centre of each Investment Focus Area. 

To illustrate the level of industrial disruption to come: around 36% of currently operating power plants and more than 70% of those planned through 2034 - equivalent to more than 50 GW capacity of the planned power plants - are expected to be operated by Independent Power Producers (IPPs), not the state utility PLN. 

This means that what the diverse landscape of businesses actually do - how they consult affected communities, minimise their environmental footprints, manage labour in supply chains, or approach land acquisition - will determine whether the transition delivers on its justice commitments.

Indonesia's JETP acknowledges this through its Just Transition Framework, which positions human rights as an overarching principle governing nine implementation standards covering social, environmental, and economic dimensions. 

But policy commitments  and concrete implementation  are not the same thing. As IHRB's submission to the JETP Secretariat on the 2025 Progress Report sets out, three concrete changes are needed.

Three things needed to deliver on the "J" in JETP

1. Translate human rights principles into binding obligations for businesses

Human rights are currently treated as a normative reference point in Indonesia’ JT Framework, rather than as operational requirements. The Framework's human rights component emphasises avoiding violations and enabling stakeholder engagement, which are important foundations, but insufficient on their own to drive accountability at the project level.

A meaningful shift requires embedding specific obligations into the JETP financing process itself.

Project proponents receiving JETP funding should be required to adopt human rights policies, conduct human rights due diligence (HRDD) consistent with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), maintain accessible grievance mechanisms, and report publicly on how harms are being prevented or remediated. 

Currently, neither the project screening mechanism nor the financing process requires any just transition assessment as a condition of funding access. The practical risk is that projects with unresolved land disputes, inadequate community consultation, or labour violations in their supply chains can qualify for concessional finance.

This is sometimes framed as a tension between moving quickly on climate goals and applying human rights safeguards. In practice, projects that skip due diligence tend to generate conflict, material project delays, and reputational exposure. Conversely, companies with stronger human rights practices tend to be more productive and attract more stable investment. 

The case for a "compliance-for-access" model - where meeting credible just transition standards is a precondition for JETP financing - is both principled and practical.

The JT Framework also needs to look beyond power sector assets. 

Some of the most significant human rights risks lie both upstream and downstream: nickel mining and processing for battery supply chains (where environmental degradation and labour violations are documented), land acquisition for transmission corridors, and the socio-economic consequences of coal mine closures for workers and host communities. 

Expanding JT assessments to the pre-feasibility stage across all six IFAs would allow the framework to function as a real governance tool - identifying risk hotspots across the full transition value chain, not just at the point of project approval.

2. Establish grievance mechanisms that can deliver genuine remedy

The JETP's Meta-Monitoring Framework includes an indicator tracking complaint resolution, with a target that 90% of complaints filed under JETP be resolved within 90 days. This is a positive start, but it is entirely procedural. It measures throughput, not remedy quality - and it currently lacks the governance mandates, independent oversight, and minimum standards needed to meet the UNGPs' criteria for effective grievance mechanisms.

Under the UNGPs, a grievance mechanism must be legitimate, accessible, predictable, equitable, transparent, rights-compatible, and capable of continuous learning. Crucially, it must be capable of providing meaningful remedy - not just logging and closing complaints.

A practical path forward would direct all project proponents operating within the scope of the JETP to maintain their own operational-level grievance mechanisms (OGMs) aligned with UNGP standards, while the JETP Secretariat takes responsibility for oversight. This avoids creating a parallel bureaucracy while giving the Secretariat a clear role in escalation and learning - including translating patterns of complaint into formal policy recommendations to the Government of Indonesia and IPG. 

The JT Framework should also establish minimum standards for project-level grievance mechanisms - covering accessibility, complainant protections, required timelines, confidentiality, and mandatory disclosure - so that the quality of remedy does not vary arbitrarily across projects and regions.

3. Strengthen the regulatory and enabling environment for responsible business conduct

The JT Framework cannot achieve its stated goals without a supporting policy environment. Several specific gaps currently limit what responsible business conduct can achieve in practice.

The JT Framework itself lacks formal legal standing. 

It guides project proponents but cannot compel them. One concrete opportunity: the regulation on the Power Sector Energy Transition Roadmap (Ministry of Energy Regulation No. 10 of 2025) creates a vehicle for integrating JT Framework indicators as mandatory criteria in coal retirement assessments and PLN's project screening processes. Taking that step would transform the framework from a guidance document into an enforceable standard.

On human rights governance, Indonesia has two relevant presidential regulations that have not yet been connected to energy sector processes. 

These are the Human Rights National Action Plan (No. 51 of 2021) and the Human Rights and Business National Strategy (No. 60 of 2023). Revisiting, strengthening, and operationalising these instruments in the context of energy transition would introduce HRDD requirements and grievance mechanisms across key sectors. The renewal period of the Human Rights National Action Plan in 2026 onwards should be the opportunity to further elaborate the human rights obligations related to the wider energy sector but also specifically those that are contextual to just energy transition. 

Environmental impact assessment processes also need updating. 

Current EIA requirements focus on technical environmental indicators and tend to frame social and economic impacts as positive outcomes - without conducting rigorous risk assessment for affected communities.

Access to information and meaningful participation need stronger policy backing. 

This means ensuring communities have access to project information from early planning stages - including through Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) processes where Indigenous Peoples are involved - and building anti-corruption safeguards into JETP financing conditions.

Finally, financial disclosure rules need to catch up with transition realities. 

OJK Regulation 51/2017 does not require financial institutions to report on labour displacement or land-related transition risks, leaving a significant accountability gap for the banks and investors co-financing JETP projects. Updating these requirements, alongside embedding just transition conditions directly into JETP financial agreements, would create a coherent chain of accountability from international finance down to project-level delivery.

IHRB's work on Indonesia's JETP

IHRB focuses on the business and human rights dimensions of JETPs. Please do reach out to our team if you’re working on similar issues (info [at] ihrb.org).